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Implications of Money-Back Guarantees for Individual Retirement 
Accounts: Protection Then and Now 
1 Introduction 
Numerous countries have adopted tax-qualified defined contribution retirement 
accounts as a means to fill the gap between retiree income needs and benefits payable under 
national social security systems.1 Additionally, many policymakers seek mechanisms to protect 
savers against longevity risk and capital market volatility, and one approach has been to require 
money-back guarantees for participant contributions. For instance, the European Commission 
(2019) recently adopted a European Commission (2017) proposal to establish a Pan-European 
Personal Pension Product (PEPP), a standardized tax-qualified funded defined contribution 
plan offered by financial institutions such as asset managers, life insurers, and banks; these will 
provide pension portability to over 220 million workers across the European Union. During the 
worker’s accumulation phase, the provider must offer a default option (called the Basic PEPP) 
which governs the plan’s investment strategy if the saver does not provide instructions on how 
to invest the funds. Besides the yearly cap on fees and expenses of 1% of accumulated capital, 
this default option requires capital protection either in form of a money-back guarantee by the 
provider, or some other technique that will ensure that the PEPP saver can recoup the funds 
contributed by the end of the accumulation phase. 
Prior studies have suggested that such investment guarantees can protect against 
shortfall risk and longevity risk to enhance financially-illiterate workers’ retirement security, 
yet there are also economic costs of such guarantees which must be financed. For instance, 
several Latin American nations instituted government guarantees for pension savings (e.g. 
Pennacchi, 1999; Fischer, 1999), and private sector institutions have also provided principal 
                                                 
1 For instance, defined contribution or 401(k) retirement saving plans in the U.S. are the primary tax-qualified 
mechanism helping private sector workers accumulate retirement assets, now totaling over $5 trillion (ICI, 2018). 
Ernst & Young (2017) recently showed that individual retirement accounts are available in most European Union 
countries, though the market is highly fragmented across member states. Total assets under management amount 
to €600 billion, of which most, €224 billion, is held by the German Riester IRAs. 
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guarantees at market prices: for instance, Lachance and Mitchell (2003) showed that money-
back guarantees cost around 5% of annual contributions for U.S. Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs). Nevertheless, that research was conducted in the context of a higher interest 
rate environment than is presently the case; since low returns now appear to be persistent 
(Horneff et al., 2018), these costs may be even more substantial.  
Additionally, previously research has not explored how such guarantees could shape 
behavior in the context of a life cycle framework, which is the subject of the present paper. 
Accordingly, a key contribution of our work is to build a general model which we use to assess 
the costs and benefits of a mandatory money-back pension guarantee. Moreover, we examine 
how such guarantees affect saving, investment, and retirement wellbeing, while incorporating 
important aspects of the tax structure, social security benefits, and capital markets (e.g., Cocco 
and Gomes, 2012; Horneff et al., 2015, 2018). Specifically, we evaluate the case of the IRAs 
adopted in Germany in 2002 under the Riester program which permits private sector money 
managers, life insurers, and banks to offer tax-qualified individual retirement accounts, as long 
as these include embedded mandatory money-back guarantees. Riester accounts are very 
popular, with over 35% of eligible German employees holding contracts, making them more 
prevalent than occupational pensions (Börsch-Supan et al., 2012, 2015). Not only do product 
providers promise participants a money-back guarantee during the accumulation phase, but the 
government also subsidizes contributions (to a cap) by workers in the form of deferred taxation 
and direct subsidies. In retirement, benefits must be paid as guaranteed lifetime income streams.  
Our goal is to determine optimal consumption, stock and bond holdings, and 
contributions into and withdrawals from the Riester accounts, taking into account capital market 
shocks, uncertainty about labor income and remaining lifetimes, and the rich institutional details 
relevant to the tax and social security benefit structure. We then compare results without the 
money-back guarantees, in both ‘normal’ and ‘low return’ environments.  
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We present three main findings. First, during what we call ‘historically normal’ capital market 
periods, money-back guarantees have only a modest effect on consumption prior to retirement, 
but they reduce post-retirement consumption for about 80% of retirees by an average of 2.3% 
per year (or €360 annually). This means that eliminating these money-back guarantees would 
boost old-age consumption for most elderly. Second, in a persistent low interest regime such as 
at present, this type of guarantee has a more complex impact. On the one hand, many people do 
benefit from the guarantee protection: the shortfall probability of losing money at age 67 
without the guarantee is 18.1%, compared to 6.5% in the ‘normal’ capital market environment. 
Yet the costs of protection are so high that 82% of retirees end up with far lower old-age 
consumption, by an average of 10% (or €950 per year). In addition, consumption during the 
work life is also slightly lower with the guarantee. Third, we ask whether implementing an age-
based life cycle investment approach would be an advantageous risk mitigation technique, 
compared to the money-back guarantee. We show that during a ‘normal’ capital market, life 
cycle funds provide even less lifetime consumption than guaranteed accounts. In contrast, under 
current market conditions, a life cycle fund with sufficiently high equity exposure generates 
greater average old-age consumption compared to the money-back guarantee.  
In what follows, Section 2 provides additional details on Riester accounts and discusses 
how money-back guarantees are priced. Our life cycle model which includes money-back 
guarantees in retirement accounts is developed in Section 3. In Section 4, we compare the 
outcomes of the life cycle model with, and without, a money-back guarantee. Section 5 presents 
robustness analyses using different preferences and fees on contributions; we compare a money-
back guarantee with a life cycle investment strategy. We also show that, with inflation-adjusted 
guarantees, consumption is harmed even more. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Riester Individual Retirement Accounts with Money-Back Guarantees 
2.1 Eligibility, Incentives and Plan Sponsors  
In 2018, 45 million German employees were entitled to contribute to tax-qualified 
Riester IRAs, and 16.6 million of these held this type of contract (see BMAS, 2017). Two 
complementary subsidies incentivize workers to save for retirement using such accounts.2 First, 
the federal government pays a yearly subsidy of up to €175 plus €300 per child younger than 
age 25 into each worker’s IRA. To qualify for the full subsidy, the sum of employee 
contributions plus subsidies must equal 4% of pre-tax labor income (to a cap of €2,100). If the 
threshold of 4% is not met, subsidies are reduced proportionally. Second, employees earning 
higher incomes can benefit from deferred taxation; that is, IRA contributions to an annual cap 
of €2,100 are paid from pre-tax income, and investment earnings on account assets are tax-
exempt.3 In all cases, retirement withdrawals are subject to income tax.  
Approximately 65% of Riester contracts are held with life insurers, 20% with asset 
managers, and 5% with banks; the dominant form is accumulation/decumulation plans of 
financial assets which are the focus of this paper.4 Providers of these contracts must fulfill 
substantial investment and income guarantees codified in the ‘Certification of Retirement 
Pension Contracts Act.’ Here, during the decumulation phase: (i) payouts are allowed only from 
age 62 onwards; (ii) not more than 30% of accumulated assets may be withdrawn as a lump 
sum; (iii) the remaining assets must be distributed as lifelong non-decreasing guaranteed 
nominal benefits; and (iv) mandatory annuitization of the retiree’s remaining capital is required 
by age 85 (at the latest). Usually, to fulfill the last requirement, IRA providers devote a share 
of their IRA balances at age 67 to buy deferred annuities that pay benefits from age 85. In 
addition, product providers must offer a money-back guarantee: that is, if at the end of the 
                                                 
2 For an overview of the governmental incentives to engage in Riester plans see Börsch-Supan et al. (2008). 
3 The German tax authorities check whether the deductibility of contributions is more favorable than subsidies and 
settles corresponding differences through tax refunds. 
4 Banks also offer Riester IRAs in the form of special mortgage loan contracts, there have a 10% market share. 
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accumulation phase the account value is lower than the sum of payments into the IRA, the 
provider must cover the shortfall using its own equity capital.  
The investment and income guarantees for Riester IRAs have become considerably 
more expensive since the scheme was adopted in 2002. The main explanation for this is that the 
European Central Bank’s quantitative easing strategy has caused interest rates to plummet from 
a historical norm of about 3% down to the current 0% (or even negative) nominal rate. One 
result is that premiums for mandatory annuitization have become increasingly expensive. For 
example, the price of a deferred annuity purchased at age 67 paying lifelong benefits of €1 from 
age 85 onwards rose from €2.63 (with an assumed interest rate of 3%) to €2.92 (at a 0% interest 
rate). Another is that the low interest environment has also led to a substantial increase in the 
costs of hedging the money-back guarantee, as we show next. 
2.2 Costs of Money-Back IRA Guarantees 
The impact of very low interest rates on the hedging cost for the money-back guarantee 
has been non-trivial. To illustrate how this works, we follow Lachance and Mitchell (2003) and 
apply option pricing techniques for a simplified IRA. We assume constant annual contributions 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇) by the plan participant until the end of the accumulation phase at time 𝑇𝑇, and 
the plan provider is obliged to compensate for any losses below the sum of contributions. The 
put hedging approach allows the provider to offer clients participation in the stock market while 
transferring shortfall risks of not achieving the guaranteed amount to the capital markets. 
Formally, yearly contributions 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  are used to buy 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 units of an equity portfolio 
(represented by a diversified stock index) with price 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 plus the same number of at-the-money 
European put options with price 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 and maturity at the end of the saving phase, i.e. 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡. Units of the equity portfolio are allocated to the plan participant’s IRA. If the value of the 
equity portfolio is lower than the sum of contributions, the provider must pay the difference, 
equal to max(∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 0)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 , into the participant’s IRA; this produces an uncertain 
final IRA value at time 𝑇𝑇 of max(∑ 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 ,𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 . The put premiums charged by the 
6 
 
provider from the participant’s contributions are the cost of the money-back guarantee (see 
Lachance and Mitchell, 2003).  
To quantify hedging costs for plan participants, we generate 100,000 Monte Carlo 
simulation paths, along with the resulting profit and loss (P&L) position of the plan provider. 
We posit that the stochastic dynamics of equity investments follow a geometric Brownian 
motion; moreover, consistent with the life cycle model we discuss later, we assume a volatility 
of 21.41% and a risk premium of 6% per year. Put option premiums are calculated using the 
Black and Scholes (1973) approach under both a ‘normal’ interest rate environment (𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 3%) 
and the current low interest rate scenario (𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 0%). Table 1 summarizes the guarantee costs 
for the plan participants, expected guarantee payouts, and the expected P&L for the plan 
provider, for different time horizons and the two interest rate assumptions. 
 Table 1 here  
Panel A of Table 1 addresses the cost of the guarantee from the participants’ perspective. 
At an interest rate of 3%, guarantee costs as a share of total contributions average 9.7-11.2%, 
depending on the plan’s investment horizon. At lower interest rates, guarantee costs increase 
since the put options become more expensive. For instance, if the interest rate were 0% and the 
horizon 42 years (coincident with the Riester pension accumulation phase), one third (35.8%) 
of annual contributions on average would need to be devoted to put options; over a 10 year 
horizon, the premiums amount to 19% of annual contributions. Panel B indicates that, in the 
3% interest rate environment, expected guarantee payouts to the plan participant (as a 
percentage of total contributions) are lowest for long plan horizons, since the portfolio value is 
less likely to fall short of the guarantee amount. Yet for low interest rates, a larger share of 
contributions must be spent on put premiums which effectively reduces the asset base and 
increases guarantee payments from the provider to the client. In all scenarios, guarantee 
payments are lower than the put premiums charged to the participants. Hence in expectation, 
the provider might make a profit if the premiums were charged to the client and not used to buy 
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put options. For instance, at the longest plan horizon of 42 years,5 guarantee costs exceed 
payouts by 6.6% at a 3% interest rate, and by 13.9% in the 0% interest rate scenario. Of course, 
such a strategy would results in substantial downside risks to regulatory solvency capital 
requirements for the provider.6 
If the provider buys options to hedge the risk of payment obligations from the money-
back guarantee, the resulting expected profit/loss appears in Panel C (again expressed in terms 
of contributions).7 At a 3% interest rate, the provider expects to suffer losses only for short 
investment horizons, and its P&L becomes more positive, the longer the investment horizon. 
That is, over a plan life of 42 years, the provider earns an expected gain of 2.2% of 
contributions. Conversely, at a 0% interest rate, the P&L worsens as the investment horizon 
lengthens, and no gains occur in expectation as initially high option premiums permit only 
relatively small investment in the equity index. Thus, strikingly, in the 0% interest scenario, 
even if the saving plan lasted for 42 years, losses of 7% of contributions would be expected.  
It is not surprising that rising hedging costs in the low interest rate environment have 
prompted those offering Riester pensions to question their ability to continue supplying the 
market.8 While savers still seem to favor guarantees,9 plan provider concerns about the viability 
of the guaranteed IRA market may undermine the future of the funded private pension system 
as a complement to the statutory pay-as-you-go old-age scheme. In what follows, we assess 
                                                 
5 Options of such long maturities cannot be bought in markets, yet asset managers could buy replication portfolios. 
6 Depending on its legal structure, a provider is required to hold regulatory solvency capital to cover possible 
liabilities from the money-back guarantee: regulations vary for banks (according to the Capital Requirement 
Directive), life insurers (according to the Solvency II framework, see Van Hulle, 2019), and asset managers 
(according to circular 2/2007 by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority).  
7 Gains and losses may be incurred because, despite taking the money to buy portfolio insurance directly from 
contributions, all put payoffs accrue to the provider which is liable for shortfalls in a participant’s account. Losses 
occur if put payoffs do not suffice to compensate for shortfall in client accounts, e.g. in downward-trending 
markets. Gains result from volatile markets when puts bought at high stock index values in intermediate periods 
come to pay off, while no or little compensation payments are made to client accounts due to an positive account 
development. 
8 Moreover, the German asset managers tend to be subsidiaries of major commercial banks which have also become 
subject to increasingly tight equity capital requirements in the European context. 
9 Union Investment (2018) reported that 88% of their IRA participants said they favored IRAs with money-back 
guarantees over otherwise identical IRAs without guarantees. 
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whether abolishing these guarantee features could ultimately improve savers’ financial 
wellbeing. 
3 Evaluating Money-Back IRA Guarantees in a Life Cycle Model 
Evaluating how mandatory money-back guarantees in IRAs impact workers’ saving, 
investment, and consumption patterns requires us to build and calibrate a discrete-time life cycle 
model of consumption and portfolio choice. We posit that the utility-maximizing worker 
decides how much to consume and to invest in risky stocks, risk-free bonds, and tax-qualified 
IRAs. Our framework incorporates key aspects of the German tax structure, social security 
system, labor income processes, and capital market behavior. 
3.1 Preferences and Optimization 
We consider an individual who lives from time 𝑡𝑡 = 1 (age 25) to 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑇𝑇 = 76 (age 100) 
and retires at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾 = 43 (age 67, the regular retirement age for persons born after 1964). 
Utility is measured by a time-separable CRRA utility function with constant relative risk 
aversion 𝛾𝛾, defined over yearly spending for consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, deflated by the level of a 
consumer price index Π𝑡𝑡 =  Π𝑡𝑡−1(1 + 𝜋𝜋). The price index is assumed to evolve at a constant 
and deterministic rate of inflation, 𝜋𝜋, and Π0 is normalized to one. Inflation effectively devalues 
the IRA’s money-back guarantee due to the fact that it is a nominal rather than an inflation-
adjusted promise. Accordingly, the model cannot be solved entirely in real terms but instead 
requires explicit treatment of inflation (as in Koijen et al., 2010).10 
The subjective one-period discount factor is denoted 𝛽𝛽 and the conditional survival 
probability from period 𝑡𝑡 to period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. Survival probabilities are taken from the 
population mortality table provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The value 
                                                 
10 Our model is solved in a nominal world (i.e. all income figures, tax allowances, etc. grow at the rate of inflation) 
and the effect of inflation in the intertemporal tradeoff between consuming now and in the future is considered by 
optimizing real consumption. Results shown in figures and tables are converted back to real terms at the end of 
the subsequent simulation procedure.  
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function 𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡 depends on current realizations of the state variables: these comprise cash on hand, 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅 (in real terms); the value of the Riester account, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡; the guaranteed amount (i.e. the sum 
of contributions and subsidies), 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡; the annual payout of the deferred annuity after age 85, 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡; 
and the labor and retirement income states, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡. Expected lifetime utility is maximized by solving 
the recursive Bellman equation with respect to real consumption, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡/Π𝑡𝑡, stock investment, 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, bond investment, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, the contribution into the IRA, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡, and lump sum withdrawals 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 from 
IRAs:  
 
𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) = 
max
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡,𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 �(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡/Π𝑡𝑡)1−𝛾𝛾1 − 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1)]�  . (1) 
Presumed short-sale and borrowing constraints imply non-negativity of all control 
variables, such that: 
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡,𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0 . (2) 
 With up to five state variables (excluding time 𝑡𝑡), this model is computationally 
expensive to solve, especially due to the need to interpolate the future value function over 
multiple dimensions. To mitigate the curse of dimensionality, we discretize the labor income 
process to 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 age-dependent levels; this implies that 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 times as many optimization problems 
must be solved relative to a continuous income process, but we benefit from interpolating 
through one fewer dimension. Given the model’s richness in terms of state variables and the 
disproportionate increase in interpolation time as dimensionality increases, discretization 
allows considerable reduction in execution time.  
Transitions between discretized income states are governed by a Markov chain,11 where 
𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 denotes the probability of migrating from a current income state 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 to a subsequent 
period’s state 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1. Consequently, the expectation of the value function 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1(∙)] is the 
                                                 
11 Hubener et al. (2016) use this approach to model transitions across family states. 
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probability-weighted average of future value functions given today’s income state 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 
transition probabilities 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 : 
 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1(∙)] = �𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1,𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡+1,𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡+1, 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑠𝑠)]
𝑠𝑠
 . (3) 
3.2 Budget Constraints and Evolution of Cash on Hand 
Prior to retirement (at 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾 = 43), available financial resources 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 are allocated across 
consumption, 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, investment in stocks, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, investment in risk-free bonds, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, and contributions 
to the IRA, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡. After retirement, additional contributions into IRAs are not possible so the 
budget constraint is given by:  
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = �𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  for  𝑡𝑡 < 𝐾𝐾
𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  for  𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾 . (4) 
Next period’s cash on hand before, at, and after retirement evolves as follows:  
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻)(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 − 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1                         for  𝑡𝑡 < 𝐾𝐾                  (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻) + 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) ∙ (1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 − 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1      for  𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾                  (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡) ∙ (1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 − 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1        for 𝐾𝐾 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐾𝐾 + 17(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻) + 𝐷𝐷) ∙ (1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 − 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1           for 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾 + 18          (5) 
The first component of 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 is gross income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, either from work or from statutory 
pension benefits after retirement. Gross income is reduced by federal income taxes and required 
social security contributions (including unemployment insurance, health benefits, and state 
pensions), jointly levied as an average deduction rate 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇. This formulation reflects the detailed 
rules and parameters of the German social security system as well as the progressive income 
tax code. (Appendix A provides additional details on the German social security and income 
tax system). The average deduction rate is a function of gross income and whether someone is 
employed (equivalently, if time 𝑡𝑡 < 𝐾𝐾 = 43) or retired. We apply the rules and parameters as 
of 2014 to generate values for 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 between 10% for retirees with relatively low pension 
benefits and 44% for workers with salaries above €150,000. The resulting net income is further 
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reduced by age-dependent housing costs, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻, which we estimate using data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).12 (Additional details are provided in Appendix B.) 
The second component of cash on hand is the market value of last year’s investments in 
stocks and bonds including returns earned, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 , less taxes on capital gains 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1. 
𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 is the gross return on stocks which is assumed to be lognormally distributed, and 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 is the 
risk-free return on bonds. Investment income from stocks and bonds is tax-exempt up to an 
annual limit of €801 and in excess of this amount a rate of 26.375% applies, so capital gains 
taxes are given by 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1 = max�0, 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡(𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡�𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 − 1� − 801� ∙ 26.375%. After 
retirement, cash on hand includes lump sum withdrawals 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (at age 67), withdrawals 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 (from 
age 68 onwards) and constant nominal annuity payouts 𝐷𝐷 from the IRA (from age 85 or 𝐾𝐾 + 18 
onward), both reduced by income taxes and contributions to health insurance. Subsidies are not 
part of cash on hand, as the government directly pays these into workers’ retirement accounts. 
In addition, each individual is posited to start the work life with a given level of initial 
wealth, which we assume coincides with the worker’s first simulated income level. Levels of 
starting wealth are estimated from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Panel on Household Finances 
(PHF) for individuals age 23-27.13 In calibrating capital market parameters, we use post-
German reunification data from June 1991 to December 2015; all calculations are carried out 
on a monthly basis and then annualized. All-item consumer prices are taken from Datastream 
(time series: BDCONPRCF); interest rate data refer to 1-year German government bonds taken 
from Deutsche Bundesbank (time series: WZ9808); and equity data are from Datastream and 
correspond to the performance index of the largest German stock index, DAX 30.  
                                                 
12 Property is the largest component of household wealth (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016), yet its purchase is 
generally accompanied by significant debt financing, violating our non-negativity assumption on asset holdings. 
For this reason we do not integrate housing decisions in the model and implicitly treat everyone as tenants. Panel 
A of Appendix B reports our estimated rental costs as a percentage of net income for the German population 
(estimated using SOEP). 
13 The values of starting wealth from lowest to highest are {€0, €140, €515, €1,250, €2,300, €3,980, €7,300, 
€12,300, €17,180, €40,300}. 
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For our ‘base case’ in the analysis below, we use sample means for all variables 
reflecting what has traditionally been seen as a ‘normal’ capital market environment. 
Specifically, the annual inflation rate 𝜋𝜋 is estimated at 1.75%, close to the European Central 
Bank’s (2018) inflation target of ‘below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.’ Mean nominal 
returns on government bonds 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 are set at 3%. The equity risk premium of the stock index is 
6.83% with a volatility of 21.41%; we downward-adjust the excess return to 6% in order to 
reflect management fees and trading costs. 
3.3 Labor Earnings and Retirement Income  
To model labor income, most life cycle studies adapt the methodology of Carroll and 
Samwick (1997), where earnings are a function of a deterministic trend component as well as 
permanent and transitory shocks (e.g. Cocco et al., 2005; Fagereng et al., 2017). By contrast, 
Fehr and Habermann (2008) discretized the labor income process to six levels (which they term 
productivity levels) with the transition path between the levels governed by a Markov transition 
matrix. In what follows, we combine both approaches, such that employees can migrate across 
𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 10 income levels 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠 = 1, … , 10); we also add a transitory shock lognormally-
distributed with ln�𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠�~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎u,s2 ,𝜎𝜎u,s2 ). This approach retains the essence of Carroll and 
Samwick’s (1997) method while being computationally less burdensome. Consequently, during 
the work life (𝑡𝑡 < 𝐾𝐾), labor income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 is the product of the age and state-dependent income 
level 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 and the transitory shock 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 such that: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 = 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠. (6) 
We calibrate the labor income process based on SOEP data (details appear in Appendix 
C). Figure 1 shows the 10 resulting estimated labor income levels. 
 Figure 1 here  
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After retirement at age 67, our model has individuals receiving constant (real) lifelong 
benefits from the German statutory pension system; which are included in taxable income. 
These benefits are based on individual labor earnings (up to a ceiling) relative to population 
average labor income each year in the working life. Given 2014 values for the contribution 
ceiling (of €71,400) and mean income (of €34,514), an annual maximum of 71,400
34,514 = 2.0687 
pension points can be earned. The sum of pension points earned is then multiplied by a ‘pension 
value factor’ (of €343.3) to determine annual pension income. Given 42 working years in the 
model, this implies a maximum attainable annual pension benefit of €29,828.14  
3.4 The Structure of the Riester IRA 
During the working life, the employee decides how much to contribute 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 to the IRA 
each period. In addition, the government contributes an amount 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 that includes the basic 
subsidy of up to €175, plus subsidies of up to €300 per child. In the model, we treat the number 
of children as deterministic and estimate the count of dependents using the SOEP data.15 Two 
requirements must be fulfilled to be eligible to receive the maximum possible subsidy of 
𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 175 + 300 ⋅ 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. First, the worker must pay at least €60 of own contributions to 
receive any subsidy at all, i.e. 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ≥ 60. Second, the sum of the worker’s own contribution 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
plus the government’s subsidy 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 must equal the lesser of 4% of last year’s annual gross income 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 or €2,100 (formally 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡  ≥ min (0.04 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1, 2100)). Lower IRA payments 
proportionally reduce the subsidies. Consequently, the fraction (0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1) of the maximum 
attainable subsidy granted is given by (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ≥ 60): 
 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 = max � 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡min(0.04 ∙ 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1, 2100) − 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , 1� (7) 
                                                 
14 We use the same number of 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 retirement income levels as for labor income, but once the pension state has been 
set, it remains indefinitely. Numerical values of each level’s mean pension points and benefits (and boundaries 
between levels) are derived by simulating the income process prior to the optimization. 
15 Receipt of Riester child subsidies is contingent on entitlement to governmental child-care allowances, which is 
not reported in the SOEP. Instead we use the number of children living with parents as a proxy. Panel B of 
Appendix B reports our estimated numbers of children by age in the population. 
14 
 
and the resulting subsidy paid into the IRA is: 
 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . (8) 
During the work life, our model assumes that IRA assets are fully invested in stocks, 
and the product provider purchases at-the-money put options to hedge the money-back 
guarantee.16 Put premiums 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 are directly charged from contributions, determined using the 
Black and Scholes (1973) formula. In addition, front-end loads are also paid out of 
contributions. In our base case analysis we set fees 𝜁𝜁 to 0%, but in sensitivity analysis we allow 
for a front-end load of 𝜁𝜁 = 5%. Also, our model rules out the possibility of withdrawals from 
the IRA before retirement.17 
IRA contributions cease at the age of 67 (𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾 = 43). If the plan balance at that time 
has fallen below the worker’s lifetime sum of contributions and government subsidies, the 
product provider must top up the account by paying the difference Υ = max(∑ (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡) −𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡=1
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 , 0). Subsequently, the saver may elect to withdraw up to 30% of the IRA value as a lump 
sum, 𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿. From the remaining balance, an assumed share of 20% is spent to purchase a deferred 
annuity that provides lifelong, nominally-fixed benefits of 𝐷𝐷 from age 85 onward. In pricing 
the deferred life annuity, we assume the discount rate corresponds to the assumed bond return; 
we also apply a population mortality table and add a markup of 12.5% to the respective annuity 
factor to reflect average loadings observed in the German private annuity market (Kaschützke 
and Maurer, 2011).18 
Annual withdrawals of IRA assets from age 68 (𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾 + 1) until age 84 (𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾 + 17) 
are governed by the formula 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡85−𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, which implies that an increasing fraction of the 
                                                 
16 This assumption implies that the guarantee cost we derive is an upper bound. 
17 Penalty-free early withdrawals are feasible if the amounts are used to purchase or construct owner-occupied 
property. Nevertheless, housing decisions are not part of our model. 
18 The European Union Directive 2004/113/EC provides that men and women must be treated equally when 
calculating insurance premiums, so we compute annuity prices based on a unisex mortality table. The 
corresponding price of a deferred annuity of €1 bought at age 67 making lifelong payments from age 85 onwards 
at a constant interest rate of 3% (0%) is €2.6309 (€2.9231). 
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remaining balance is withdrawn and full depletion of the account occurs at age 84. The 
government also requires that benefits during the payout phase may not decrease. Since the 
provider must make up shortfalls with its equity capital, the portfolio allocation is shifted to a 
mix of 20% equity and 80% bonds during the payout phase. From age 85 onwards retirees 
receive a lifelong income stream from the deferred annuity purchased at age 67. Overall, the 
evolution of the IRA’s value is given by:  
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 =
⎩
⎨
⎧
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡)(1 − 𝜁𝜁) − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 for  𝑡𝑡 < 𝐾𝐾(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + Υ) ∙ 0.8 −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 for  𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ �0.2 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 0.8 ∙ 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓�  −𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 0 for  𝐾𝐾 < 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐾𝐾 + 17for  𝑡𝑡 > 𝐾𝐾 + 17          . (9) 
3.5 Calibration and Numerical Solution 
We use dynamic stochastic programming to recursively solve the individual’s 
optimization problem by backward induction. Derived policies govern how to behave optimally 
so as to maximize the present value of utility from today’s and future consumption. During the 
retirement phase, for all specifications, the model includes four state variables: cash on hand 
(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡), the IRA balance (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡), payouts from the deferred annuity (𝐷𝐷), and the retirement income 
state (𝑠𝑠). The state space is discretized using a 30(𝑋𝑋)×20(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴)×10(𝐷𝐷)×10(𝑠𝑠) grid size with 
equal spacing in the natural logarithm (measured in €1,000) for the three continuous state 
variables (𝑋𝑋, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴,𝐷𝐷). During the work life and with an IRA investment guarantee, the state of 
the deferred annuity is replaced by an equal number of grid points tracking the sum of 
guaranteed contributions and subsidies (𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡), leaving the number of optimizations per time step 
unaltered at 60,000. In the absence of a guarantee, this state can be saved which decreases the 
problem size by factor of ten relative to the guarantee case. For each grid point, we calculate 
the optimal policies and value functions 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝐽𝐽𝑡𝑡+1(∙)] using Gauss-Hermite quadrature 
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integration and cubic spline interpolation.19 In the subsequent simulation, 100,000 independent 
life cycles are generated using optimal feedback controls.  
In a matching procedure closely related to Love (2010), we select preference parameters 
such that the model generates average asset holdings consistent with empirical evidence derived 
from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s PHF. Specifically, the discount factor 𝛽𝛽 and the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion 𝛾𝛾 are chosen in model calibration such that the sum of relative squared 
differences between average model wealth and the empirical data is minimized using five-year 
age groups. The best fit is achieved with a discount factor of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.93 and relative risk aversion 
of 𝛾𝛾 = 7. Figure 2 displays model-generated and empirical data for the eight age groups.  
 Figure 2 here  
4 Model Results 
Next we illustrate the implications of switching from the money-back guaranteed IRA 
to an otherwise identical retirement account without the guarantee. In particular, we show how 
eliminating the guarantee in the model introduced above alters optimal contributions to the IRA 
during the work life, IRA payouts during retirement, liquid asset holdings, and consumption 
opportunities over the life cycle for a utility-maximizing worker. Our base case calibration 
assumes a nominal risk-free rate of 3% and an inflation rate of 1.75%, while the alternative low 
return scenario posits a 0% interest and inflation rate. These alternatives highlight the protective 
role of the guarantee as well as its negative consequences for consumption. 
Figure 3 shows how pre-tax earnings, liquid asset holdings (stock and bonds), IRA 
contributions, balances, and payouts evolve, along with optimal non-housing consumption20 for 
a money-back guarantee IRA (Panel A) versus an IRA without a guarantee (Panel B) in the 
                                                 
19 Due to the recursive formulation of the problem, optimizations are independent within each time step and can 
be parallelized efficiently. 
20 In the following, we use the terms ‘non-housing consumption’ and ‘consumption’ interchangeably. 
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base case.21 In both scenarios, consumption is slightly hump-shaped. Rising consumption 
during the first decade of the work life results from the well-known effect of constrained 
borrowing given rising labor income (Chai et al., 2011). Falling consumption during retirement 
is mainly driven by the relatively low subjective discount factor (𝛽𝛽 = 0.93) that reduces the 
demand for consumption smoothing. It is notable that consumption during the work life is 
significantly below pre-tax labor income, mainly due to income taxes, social security 
contributions, housing costs, and to a lesser extent, savings. For example, at age 50, labor 
income peaks and workers earn on average about €39,600 per year. Out of that income, €14,400 
is spent on social security, income taxes, and capital gains taxes; €7,900 on housing expenses; 
€16,300 on consumption; and only €1,000 is devoted to savings, mostly tax-qualified IRAs. 
 Figure 3 here  
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that, with a guarantee at age 67, the IRA is reduced by about 
€40,000, to €80,000. This is because, first, the product provider expends 20% (€23,300) of the 
account balance to purchase an annuity with benefits being deferred until age 85. Second, the 
retiree withdraws about €16,300 (or 14.5%) of the IRA balance as a lump sum at that point. 
This is well below the allowed maximum of 30%, enabling the retiree to enjoy higher 
withdrawals later in life. Of this lump sum payout, about one third (35%) goes to income taxes, 
and another 50% is used to support consumption. The remaining 15% is shifted into non-
qualified liquid assets (bonds and stocks), which offer more flexibility in asset allocation and 
timing of cash flows than the IRA.  
At age 68, the saver’s income consists of €15,500 from the social insurance system, 
€4,700 from the IRA withdrawal plan, and she sells €5,100 of stocks and bonds. After taxes 
and social security payments, €4,000 is spent on housing and €16,300 on non-housing 
consumption. Of these expenses, 60% are covered by pension insurance, 18% by IRA payouts, 
                                                 
21 All values are expressed in €2015. 
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and 22% by liquidation of stock and bond holdings. In later periods, consumption smoothing 
allows the individual to reduce the sale of stocks and bonds when expected payouts from the 
IRA increase. At age 85, her IRA payouts consist only of constant nominal annuity payments. 
By then, the share of income stemming from the social insurance program has risen to 67%, 
IRA annuity payouts to 27%, and stock and bond sales only amount to 6%. After age 85, 
consumption decreases because annuity payouts are devalued by inflation and liquid assets have 
fallen to levels inadequate to maintain previous consumption levels (e.g. at age 85 stock and 
bond sales amount to only €1,200). 
Next we compare consumption, income, and asset holding patterns for the no guarantee 
case, depicted in Panel B. While most of the results are similar, one difference is the 12% higher 
average IRA balance of €132,700 without the guarantee, versus €118,500 with the guarantee. 
Greater IRA saving results partly from lower liquid savings: by retirement, these are crowded 
out by about 10% (to only €33,500).22 Additionally, a higher share of consumption is financed 
by distributions from the IRA without the guarantee than with it (21% vs. 18% at age 67, 30% 
vs. 27% at age 85).  
Differences in IRA balances may be attributed to paying hedging costs with a money-
back guarantee, and to differences in contributions and subsidies across the two scenarios. 
Figure 4 provides a more detailed picture of optimal IRA contribution patterns over the life 
cycle, again with and without investment guarantees. Panel A shows the share of individuals 
with positive contributions to the IRA, where results are similar under the two guarantee 
scenarios. Starting from a low figure of 25%, the participation rate gradually rises to 65% at 
age 40, and then it flattens out. The lower participation rate by young workers is driven by 
relatively low (but rising, in expectation) labor incomes and households’ need to build up 
precautionary liquid savings before engaging in illiquid retirement saving. Panel B depicts 
                                                 
22 The first two columns of Table 5 summarize the data for the total population and IRAs with (without) money-
back guarantee. A breakdown by income classes is provided in Table 2. 
19 
 
average IRA contribution rates (including subsidies) as share of gross income, conditional on 
participation. Here contribution rates are hump-shaped, rising from 1.7% at age 26 to a peak of 
4.3% at age 52, falling thereafter to 1.9-2.4% after age 60. The model-determined falling 
contribution rates in later life are due to the fact that the appeal of tax deferral declines as 
retirement approaches.23 
 Figure 4 here  
Beyond age 55, Panel B of Figure 4 shows that participation and contribution rates are 
systematically higher without the guarantee. Two factors drive this outcome. First, for the 
guaranteed IRA, the cost of purchasing put options becomes more relevant with less time to 
maturity, leading people to optimally reduce contributions as they near retirement. Second, IRA 
participants without the guarantee who experience unfavorable returns late in their work lives 
will optimally increase contributions to offset losses. Ultimately, different guarantee costs and 
payouts, IRA contributions and withdrawals, and portfolio allocations, jointly translate into 
consumption differences.  
For our base calibration, the fan chart in the top panel of Figure 5 depicts path-wise 
percentage consumption differences without versus with the guarantee, where the IRA with a 
guarantee is the reference. The turquoise line in the top panel depicts the mean consumption 
difference, while the blue surface illustrates the 5th to 95th percentile with shading being 
proportional to the distribution mass. The bottom panel reports the share of people having 
higher consumption in the absence of a guarantee. Overall, mean consumption differences are 
positive in all periods (except the first), and the dispersion increases with age. Until age 50, 
consumption is virtually the same with or without the IRA money-back guarantee, while higher 
account balances do result in larger plan withdrawals and annuity payouts that improve old-age 
consumption considerably. Importantly, consumption is enhanced most when it is at its lowest 
                                                 
23 The hump-shaped contribution pattern generated by our model is largely in line with actual contribution patterns 
reported by Dolls et al. (2018), though they show contributions peaking about five years earlier. 
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levels, and the marginal utility of consumption is highest. Put differently, eliminating the 
guarantee reduces the impact of longevity risk most, just when unanticipated spending needs 
might not be met due to low levels of liquid assets and binding borrowing constraints. 
 Figure 5 here  
The bottom panel of Figure 5 shows that most people would be advantaged if their IRAs 
had no guarantee. By retirement age, for instance, three-quarters of all individuals would be 
better off without the IRA guarantee, and by the end of their lives, this percentage rises to 92%. 
This is because higher withdrawals improve consumption opportunities, and larger annuity 
payouts supplement social insurance program benefits after liquid assets are depleted. The 
bottom panel only shows the frequency of individuals who have higher consumption without 
an IRA guarantee, while the shaded areas in the top panel quantify the magnitudes of the 
changes. Overall, the distribution around the turquoise mean line is fairly symmetric, implying 
that even persons protected by the guarantee benefit relatively little. For instance, the largest 
protection offered by the guarantee occurs at age 67, when consumption with a guarantee on 
the 5th percentile would be 3% higher for those with poor capital market experiences. At the 
same age, those with positive capital market experiences at the 95th percentile could boost their 
consumption by over 6%, if the IRA had no guarantee. Until the terminal period, the level of 
protection offered tends to decrease, while excess consumption from abolishing the guarantee 
rises. For instance, at age 95, those in the 5th percentile who have the guarantee only receive 
1% more consumption. Conversely, those at the 95th percentile would expect 8% higher 
consumption if the IRA had no guarantee. In other words, the upside in terms of consumption 
from switching to an IRA regime without a guarantee exceeds the downside.  
Table 2 examines whether the implications of switching to a non-guaranteed IRA differ 
by workers by income group. In our base calibration, Panels A to D report consumption, liquid 
savings, IRA balances, and payouts (in €1,000) for the bottom, middle, and top 10% of lifetime 
income observations. Panel E quantifies the share of retiree consumption and housing costs that 
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can be financed by IRA payouts, while Panel F reports the frequency of simulated life cycles 
in which the IRA balance at retirement falls short of the guaranteed amount (both in %). The 
columns labeled ‘with’ show average amounts by age groups for the IRA regime including a 
money-back guarantee; the columns labeled ‘without’ report results for a no-guarantee regime. 
Results are presented as a percentage of the respective guarantee counterfactual. 
 Table 2 here  
 A key lesson from Panel A is that average consumption is similar in the early years, but 
without a guarantee, consumption for all three income groups increases monotonically, rising 
to 2-3% more for the no-guarantee IRA over the last 20 years of life. These improvements are 
larger in percentage terms for top and middle income earners who can afford higher IRA 
contributions, yet a 2% improvement for low income earners is still important given their high 
marginal utility of consumption at lower levels. We also find that IRAs without guarantees 
crowd out liquid savings (see Panel B). The reason is that higher average IRA payouts in 
retirement permit an individual to draw down liquid savings earlier, because the higher annuity 
payouts are sufficient to help to reduce longevity risk. This reduction in liquid assets is most 
notable for middle and low earners, both of whom reduce their liquid savings by 12% from age 
60 to 79. By contrast, workers earning the highest incomes reduce their liquid assets by only 
5%. This complements the result in Panel C that IRA balances are higher for all income groups 
without the guarantee, and those with low earnings boost their IRA balances the most. 
Another finding is that the higher level of IRA assets accrued by low income earners 
age 60-79 is +24%, without versus with a guarantee; top 10% earners accumulate only +10% 
more. As shown in Panel E of Table 2, the relative importance of IRA savings to fund old-age 
consumption for wealthier individuals exceeds that of the less wealthy. Hence the impact of 
potential losses from adverse capital market returns on consumption is much greater for higher 
paid workers. Accordingly, lower earners benefit more from a non-money-back IRA, compared 
to the high income earners. 
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Panel D summarizes the IRA payouts which mirror results of prior Panels. For the top 
(middle) earners, non-guaranteed IRA payouts are 10% (13%) higher than with guarantees; for 
low earners, IRA payouts rise by 24%. Yet this large improvement for the lowest earners 
provides only a modest (2%) total consumption increase, as their IRA balances and liquid assets 
are still low.24 Panel F quantifies the downside risk of switching from a guaranteed to a non-
guaranteed IRA regime for each of the three income groups. By construction, for scenarios with 
money-back guarantees, there is no shortfall risk (defined as having an IRA balance at 
retirement below the sum of contributions and subsidies). Even without a guarantee, the 
shortfall probability for high and middle income earners is moderate, at 3.9% and 5.8%, 
respectively. Yet for low earners, the shortfall probability is much higher, at 11.2%. This 
difference can be attributed to the fact that low income earners tend to contribute considerably 
later, around age 57.3, versus age 48.4 for high and 51.1 for middle income earners. Forgoing 
early contributions implies that the low earners build only a small cushion against adverse 
capital market developments, and therefore they are more vulnerable to losses in later lives.  
Though low earners benefit the least from additional consumption and are exposed to 
the increase in shortfall risk without guarantees, Table 3 reveals that the proportion of these 
individuals better off without the guarantee is the largest: from ages 60-79, 71% are better off, 
and 88% between the ages of 80-100. The proportions are similar for middle earners, at 75% 
and 87%, respectively. The smallest group benefited by having no guarantee is the high earners, 
yet still the majority is in better circumstances: 69% (77%) of this group enjoys more 
consumption between ages 60-79 (ages 80-100).  
 Table 3 here  
                                                 
24 Bonin (2009) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) note that poor households may find it unattractive to save in 
pension products due to high current consumption utility, such that tax incentives tend to be weaker than for their 
wealthier counterparts. 
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It is also of interest to compare IRA participation rates, which we do in Table 4. Here 
we see that for most income and age groups, the share of workers contributing to an IRA is at 
least as high without as with a guarantee.25 Nevertheless, and quite interestingly, high earners 
follow a hump-shaped participation pattern over the life cycle. Middle income earners trace out 
a flat trajectory, while participation rises for low earners near retirement to boost their private 
pension assets after having contributed little during their early and middle years. This pattern 
should be of interest to policymakers seeking to reduce retirees’ sole reliance on statutory 
pension benefits as a source of old-age income. 
 Table 4 here  
The first two columns of Table 5 provide the same information as Table 2, but results 
are now averaged over the entire population instead of by income subsets. Results for a real 
guarantee (columns 3 and 6) are discussed below, in the robustness check section. Columns 4 
and 5 at the aggregate level show results for the alternative capital market environment with 
interest and inflation rates of 0%. Here it is clear that the negative implications of the mandatory 
money-back guarantee are amplified, which we ascribe to the disproportionately higher costs 
of providing the guarantee. Table 5 also reveals that IRA balances (Panel C) and payouts (Panel 
D) during retirement plummet by about 67% under the zero interest rate regime. By contrast, 
liquid savings rise by over 40% as of the retirement date (Panel B). Yet the higher liquid savings 
are insufficient to fully compensate for lower IRA payouts, so old-age consumption (Panel A) 
falls in the low return scenario by around 9% compared to the historically ‘normal’ 
environment. Importantly, the relative advantage of abolishing the guarantee in terms of old-
age consumption rises substantially from 3% to 11% of retiree consumption, versus the normal 
capital market scenario. In other words, eliminating the money-back guarantee would strongly 
benefit retirees in the current low return environment. 
                                                 
25 One exception is for the high earners at young ages; this could be because many of them earned little when 
young and thus had lower participation rates at that time. 
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 Table 5 here  
Figure 6 provides insights into the heterogeneous changes in contributions and retiree 
consumption by average annual income, without versus with the guarantee. The x-axis shows 
average yearly lifetime labor income, while the y-axis displays the change in IRA contributions 
(including subsidies, expressed as percent of lifetime labor income) if the IRA’s investment 
guarantee were eliminated. Each of the 100,000 circles indicates how much individuals would 
gain or lose from abolishing the money-back guarantee. Green (purple) circles depict increases 
(decreases) in average yearly retirement consumption, and darker color circles reflect larger 
changes (white circles indicate small or zero changes). 
 Figure 6 here  
For the base case calibration with historically normal interest and inflation rates, Panel 
A indicates that most participants (about 81%) increase their contributions without the 
guarantee. Moreover, the dispersion in contribution changes is wider for high versus low 
earners. Consistent with the bottom Panel of Figure 5, green circles dominate, so most retirees 
enjoy greater consumption without the guarantee. Those benefitting from elimination of the 
guarantee also boost their contributions except for some low income workers whose anticipated 
consumption rises, and they therefore can cut back on contributions. The circle colors indicate 
that those who neither gain nor lose from the IRA guarantee status predominate among workers 
who cut their contributions. Importantly, while average retiree consumption is unaffected, 
eliminating the guarantee still leaves them with higher consumption during the accumulation 
phase. Moreover, those experiencing reduced old-age consumption are mainly high-income 
earners. As shown in Table 2, the relative importance of IRA savings to fund old-age 
consumption for wealthier individuals exceeds that of the less wealthy. Consequently, without 
the IRA money-back guarantee, the wealthy become more vulnerable to negative capital market 
experiences late in life, compared to their less wealthy counterparts.  
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Panel B of Figure 6 emphasizes that, in the low return environment, the IRA guarantee 
has two offsetting impacts. On the one hand, retiree consumption rises most without the 
guarantee – by an average of 6.7% – indicated by dark green circles which clearly outnumber 
the dark purple circles. On the other hand, more participants enjoy significant protection from 
a guarantee when a low return environment prevails. 
In the low return environment, several important differences should be noted. First, most 
participants who benefit from abolishing the guarantee (green circles) cut their lifetime 
contributions. Of those, a second clustering of low income earners can be observed; for them, 
the vast majority enjoys significant consumption improvements. There is more heterogeneity 
in consumption at the top of the income distribution. Again, this can be attributed to the higher 
earner’s greater exposure to poor capital market shocks toward the end of the accumulation 
period. The clustering of high income earners having large consumption losses and making 
higher contributions (top right of Panel B) are those who experienced large IRA losses in the 
decade prior to retirement. To regain IRA wealth sufficient to support old-age consumption, 
their contributions rise sharply to about 5% of income (about 2.5 times the population average).  
Overall, this Section shows that eliminating the IRA guarantee enhances average 
consumption opportunities for savers, particularly for the middle and higher earners, because 
the guarantee costs outweigh the benefits of downside protection. Moreover, people save more 
in their IRAs compared to the guaranteed IRA, allowing them to reduce their liquid stock and 
bond holdings. This conclusion is sharpened in a low return/inflation scenario, though more 
people will suffer losses when not covered by the IRA guarantee. Since significant losses can 
occur for savers without a guarantee, this raises the question if a life cycle investment strategy 
such as a target date fund might be an attractive substitute. We examine this option below.  
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5 Robustness Checks 
Having investigated the economic implications of a money-back nominal IRA guarantee 
on plan participant behavior using a standard CRRA framework and ignoring fees, we next 
explore alternative preferences and fee structures, to demonstrate that our results are robust to 
these variations. Moreover, we confirm that an inflation-protected guarantee amplifies the 
concerns already noted for nominal guarantees. Remarkably, we show that a life cycle or target 
date strategy with insufficient equity exposure can be even less attractive than a money-back 
IRA guarantee. 
5.1 Real Guarantees 
Thus far, we have taken as given the existing Riester IRA regulation requiring a nominal 
money-back guarantee at the end of the accumulation phase. Nevertheless, some authors have 
explored inflation protection over the guarantee contract’s term.26 The appeal of a real 
guarantee is that it preserves savers’ purchasing power, though it requires higher costs and 
therefore can erode account balances over time. For instance, Pennacchi (1999) and Fischer 
(1999) discussed the Latin American pension market where real guarantees were promised 
during times of high inflation: here the guarantees were usually not market-based (replicated 
by combining tradeable assets) but instead were provided by governments.  
To illustrate how an inflation-protected guarantee might work in our context, we replace 
the nominal with a real money-back guarantee.27 To this end, instead of buying at-the-money 
put options with the contributions, in-the-money put options must be purchased with strike 
prices accounting for the change in inflation until retirement. Results for the base calibration in 
Column 3 of Table 5 support our conjecture that real guarantees erode consumption even more 
                                                 
26 For instance, Feldstein and Samwick (2002) and Feldstein (2009) considered real guarantees for investment-
based Social Security reforms in the U.S. 
27 We keep the annuity payouts as nominal to maintain consistency with previous analyses. 
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than nominal guarantees.28 Specifically, old-age consumption under a real guarantee falls short 
of the nominal guarantee scheme by 2 to 4% on average (Panel A). The average timing and the 
sum of contributions is very similar across guarantee designs, so the approximately 15% decline 
in account balances and payouts may be directly attributed to higher guarantee costs (Panels C 
and D). To compensate for lower IRA payouts under a real guarantee, liquid saving increases 
beyond the levels in the other two cases.  
 Table 5 here  
Since our analysis shows that a real guarantee compounds the negative effects of nominal 
guarantees, we conclude that real guarantees also cost more in the form of lower consumption. 
5.2 Life Cycle Target Date Funds 
Some have proposed that life cycle or target date funds could constitute an alternative 
to money-back guarantees as a risk mitigation technique. This type of investment approach 
follows an age-based allocation rule, starting with higher equity shares early in life and 
gradually rebalancing along a glide path to less risky securities (such as bonds) near and into 
retirement (Vanguard, 2017). In the U.S., most of the $5 trillion invested in 401(k) defined 
contribution retirement plans is automatically defaulted into target date investment strategies. 
The U.S. legislative framework has encouraged this practice, with the 2006 Pension Protection 
Act permitting plan sponsors to include target date funds as ‘qualified default investment 
alternatives’ in participant-directed defined contribution plans. The regulatory environment for 
the European Union’s Basic PEPP also allows providers to use a life cycle strategy under the 
presumption that it is “consistent with the objective of allowing the PEPP saver to recoup the 
capital” instead of a money-back guarantee (see EU 2019/1238 (54) and Art. 46).  
                                                 
28 For the zero inflation scenario in Column 6 of Table 5, results correspond to those of the nominal guarantee in 
Column 4.  
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There are many variants of life cycle strategies in the market, but two approaches are 
common.29 One starts investors at a relative high equity exposure and reduces this share 
annually using a moderate adjustment factor. For example, Malkiel (1996) postulates that the 
percentage of IRA assets invested in equities should follow a ‘100 - age’ rule. A second 
approach retains a high equity exposure during much of the accumulation period, but imposes 
a stronger de-risking pattern near retirement. For instance Cocco et al. (2005) proposed 
reducing the 100% equity exposure from age 41 onwards by 2.5 percentage points per year until 
retirement (hereafter referred to as ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule). Using a simulation approach, 
Berardi et al. (2018) have studied a range of other life cycle approaches, finding that the value 
of contributions can be preserved with over 99% probability given an intermediate investment 
horizon of 40 years; with a 95% probability, the final account balance is likely to be worth at 
least 1.8 times the sum of contributions. While these results suggest that a life cycle approach 
could be appealing from a shortfall perspective, it is as yet unclear whether decreasing the risky 
share is preferable to a money-back guarantee.  
Accordingly, we extend our analyses by introducing the two life cycle approaches 
sketched above, where the IRA’s equity share during the participant’s work life is set either 
using a ‘100 - age’ rule, or a ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule. The remainder of the portfolio is then 
invested in risk-free bonds. To maintain consistency with the previous setup, we assume that 
the IRA switches to a 20% equity exposure after retirement. Results appear in Tables 6 and 7, 
for the base ‘normal’ case, as well as the low interest rate and inflation scenario. 
 Tables 6 and 7 here  
For the 3% nominal interest base case, Panel A of Table 6 depicts old-age consumption 
when the IRA invests in a ‘100 minus age’ life cycle fund; this proves to be some 6-11% below 
that achieved in the guarantee case. Panel A of Table 7 indicates that, during retirement, two-
                                                 
29 For an overview see Poterba et al. (2006) and Berardi et al. (2018). 
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thirds of plan participants can consume more if they have a guaranteed IRA compared to the 
more conservative life cycle fund. This is because people accumulate about one-third less in 
their IRAs with the conservative life cycle fund, compared to the guarantee case (Panel C, Table 
6).30 As a result, also the share of consumption financed by IRA payouts is 6-8 percentage 
points lower than that resulting from a 100% equity exposure with a money-back guarantee.  
This highlights the fact that the life cycle glide path reduces the equity share too quickly 
during the accumulation phase so – even with higher contributions – asset accumulation is 
hampered and less capital can be withdrawn during the payout phase (Panel D, Table 6). 
Although this disadvantage can be partly mitigated by the alternative life cycle rule (‘100-until-
40, -2.5’), it cannot be eliminated. Panel F of Table 6 confirms Berardi et al.’s (2018) finding 
that, in a normal capital market scenario, shortfalls are rare when the IRA is invested in a life 
cycle fund, occurring in only 0.8% (1.3%) of the cases for the ‘100 minus age’ rule (‘100-until-
40‘, -2.5 rule) versus the 6.5% shortfall probability without a guarantee.31  
Next we explore how results differ in a less propitious capital market environment. 
Guarantee costs for money-back guarantees become more expensive, due to higher put 
premiums. Also the larger share of bonds in the life cycle strategy produces lower returns. 
Compared to the IRA guarantee case, expected old-age consumption in Table 6 with the 
conservative (‘100 minus age’) target date fund falls short by only 1-2% (Panel A), and the 
share of consumption (including housing) financed by IRA payouts is only 0.5-0.8 percentage 
points lower (Panel E). Panel B of Table 7 shows that less than half (43-44%) of retirees 
anticipate consuming more with the life cycle fund in their IRAs, yet the shortfall probability 
(Panel F of Table 6) increases substantially to 18.7%. 
                                                 
30 Interestingly, the lower IRA balances are not driven by lower contributions: in fact, the sum of contributions is 
the highest for the life cycle fund case, averaging €29,785, followed by the no guarantee case (€24,446), and the 
guarantee case last (€22,682). 
31 We note, however, that Berardi et al. (2018) have a money-weighted timing of contributions in the middle of 
the accumulation phase, while in our case it is about five years later (after 26.2 years); ours provides less time for 
compounding. Moreover, around half of their bond investments consist of credit-risky bonds, enabling their 
portfolios to benefit from a risk premium. 
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By contrast, in the zero interest rate scenario, the ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ fund holding more 
equity can partly overcome the burden of a high bond allocation during the accumulation phase. 
Compared to the money-back IRA, this more aggressive life cycle approach provides 1-2% 
more old-age consumption (Panel A, Table 6). Moreover about 55% of retirees can expect to 
consume more (Panel B, Table 7), and the share of expenditures in old-age financed by IRA 
payouts increases by 1.2-1.8 percentage points (Panel E, Table 6). However, the shortfall 
probability is high, at 17.6%, a value inconsistent with the EU regulatory objective of 
“recouping the capital” of the PEPP saver.  
5.3 Epstein-Zin-Weil Preferences 
The use of CRRA preferences links the coefficient of risk aversion (𝛾𝛾) and the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution (EIS), inasmuch as one is the inverse of the other. To free up these 
parameters, we also investigate the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility formulation (Epstein and Zin, 
1989; Weil, 1989); this approach allows independent preferences for smoothing across time 
and states. Here, consumption differences for the alternative guarantee designs are affected two 
ways. First, lowering (increasing) the EIS means relative risk aversion is smaller (larger) than 
1/EIS, so the individual will devote less (more) emphasis on consumption smoothing across 
states, compared to CRRA preferences. This should decrease (increase) the overall demand for 
saving and narrow (increase) differences in resulting retiree consumption under the guarantee. 
Second, the relative attractiveness of the with/without guarantee scheme changes. The 
guaranteed IRA provides smaller variation in payouts, but it also pays off less compared to the 
non-guaranteed IRA. For low (higher) levels of EIS, this makes the guaranteed IRA less (more) 
attractive relative to the non-guaranteed IRA, due to the consumer’s weaker preference for 
smoothing across states.  
Two effects work in opposite directions, so it is unclear which effect dominates, ex ante. 
To resolve this, the first four columns of Table 8 provide results using Epstein-Zin-Weil 
preferences (as in Córdoba and Ripoll, 2017) for the base case calibration. Holding fixed the 
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coefficient of relative risk aversion, we then reduce (increase) the CRRA-implied 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 = 1/𝛾𝛾 =1/7 to 0.1 (0.2), to permit an assessment of changing the EIS on IRA and liquid savings 
demand, and on resulting consumption opportunities. Lowering the EIS produces a substantial 
decline in total savings, by about 14% between ages 60-79 (Panels B and C) relative to the 
CRRA case with the IRA guarantee, and an even larger reduction, of about 17%, relative to the 
CRRA case and no guarantee (Table 5, columns 1 and 2).32 Moreover, for both guarantee 
designs, the IRA share as percent of total assets falls by about 5.5 percentage points.33 
Accordingly, removing the guarantee enhances savers’ wellbeing less, driven by the substantial 
reduction in overall savings more than by a change in relative attractiveness of the two 
guarantee designs.  
 Table 8 here  
When the EIS is increased to 0.2, the opposite effects obtain. Total saving rises by 26% 
to 28% for the guarantee due to the stronger demand for smoothing across states compared to 
results using CRRA parameters. The IRA provides better smoothing across states than liquid 
savings due to the embedded deferred annuity, so a higher EIS value translates to more of the 
portfolio being held in the IRA. The IRA share as a percent of total assets rises slightly more, 
by 6.2% for the guaranteed IRA versus 5.6% for the non-guaranteed scheme. The consumption 
improvement resulting from removing the IRA guarantee is greater when the EIS rises, relative 
to the CRRA case.  
The evidence shows that, of the two channels via which EIS affects consumption, the 
adjustment in total savings dominates the effect of changing the guarantee’s attractiveness. 
Also, the positive effect of abolishing the guarantee rises when the EIS is higher, meaning that 
individuals favor consumption smoothing more strongly across states. Somewhat 
counterintuitively, the guaranteed IRA that smooths consumption more loses ground to the non-
                                                 
32 As the IRA is fully depleted beyond age 84, asset holdings in the final periods cannot be analyzed accurately.  
33 For the guarantee case it falls from 70.7% to 65.3%, and with no guarantee, from 74.9% to 69.2%. 
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guaranteed alternative, because the increased consumption gained by abolishing the guarantee 
compensates for the individual’s benefit of smoother consumption. In summary, then, results 
using Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences confirm the conclusions of prior sections: a non-guaranteed 
IRA considerably enhances consumption relative to that feasible with a guaranteed IRA. 
5.4 Front-End Loads on Contributions 
Thus far we have abstracted from sales charges levied on IRA contributions, yet in the 
German context, investing in an IRA requires payment of front-end loads (no fees are charged 
on redemptions during the payout phase). Such fees could affect the demand for guarantees for 
two reasons. First, the loads might render the IRAs so unattractive that savers could contribute 
little or nothing. In such a case, the guarantee specifications become irrelevant. Second, the 
loads could interact with expensive guarantee costs and discourage IRA investors from 
contributing. In this latter case, the IRA’s appeal would be enhanced by abolishing the 
guarantee, and consumption without a guaranteed IRA might be even greater than with the 
guarantee (as illustrated in Section 4).  
The final two columns of Table 8 document that IRA investments are still substantial 
even with a front-end load of 5% on contributions. Yet unsurprisingly, Panels C and D show 
that such loads lead to less IRA wealth accumulated for the base calibration; as a consequence, 
payouts are also lower than in the absence of such fees (compare the first two columns of Table 
5). Importantly, participant contributions do not decline symmetrically. Given the front end 
load, lifetime contributions with the guarantee fall by 7.8% (to €20,900); without the guarantee, 
contributions drop by only about 4.5% (to €23,300).34 IRA payouts differ by 12% without the 
extra loads, but by 13-14% when front-end loads are taken into account. As a result, old-age 
consumption differences are greater than without fees. Overall, with realistic sales loads, the 
negative consequences of the IRA guarantees are slightly worse.  
                                                 
34 Intuitively, with fees average timing of contributions is a little earlier to give invested capital more time to earn 
return (about 0.88 years earlier with a money-back guarantee and 0.47 years in absence of a guarantee). 
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6 Conclusions 
This study illustrates how money-back guarantees in individual retirement accounts can 
alter lifetime consumption opportunities and portfolio decisions. We build and calibrate a 
dynamic life cycle model where the saver has access to stocks, bonds, and IRAs of the German 
Riester type, and we show that old-age consumption could rise substantially for most people if 
the money-back guarantee were eliminated. This is because removing the IRA guarantee saves 
money otherwise spent to provide the guarantee, which could instead be directly invested to the 
benefit of the saver. 
During what many believed to be a ‘normal’ long-term capital market environment, with 
a 3% nominal interest rate, we show that average retirement consumption could rise by 1-3% if 
the IRA fully invested in equities had no guarantee. Moreover, three-quarters of savers could 
consume more early in retirement, rising to almost 90% of retirees near the end of life. 
Accordingly, a IRA money-back guarantee is evidently not a cost-effective way to overcome 
longevity risk for the older population. Of course giving up the guarantee does expose 
participants to shortfall risks that must be weighed against the higher return potential. We show 
that switching to a non-guaranteed IRA is appealing overall, despite the fact that those having 
adverse capital market experiences would experience losses compared to the guarantee case. 
In what we call the ‘new normal’ macroeconomic scenario, with a 0% risk-free rate, our 
results are more nuanced. It remains the case that average consumption would rise by 3-11% if 
the guarantee were removed. Yet the fraction of people experiencing shortfalls also increases 
to 18.1%. Accordingly, examining heterogeneity in outcomes becomes important. Remarkably, 
the vast majority of low to middle lifetime earners will be better served in terms of old-age 
consumption if they do not have the money-back guarantee; higher income savers benefit the 
most from the guarantee. Additionally, in a persistent low return scenario, industry providers 
may be unwilling to offer guaranteed IRAs if they must systematically run losses to make up 
for shortfalls not covered by hedging payoffs. Such obligations could eventually force IRA 
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providers to abandon the market, which would be detrimental to the future of the funded private 
retirement system. If a real rather than a nominal investment guarantee were required, this 
would harm savers more.  
Against this background, we also evaluated whether life cycle or target date funds 
should be considered as a viable alternative to the money-back IRA guarantee approach. For 
example, U.S. 401(k) retirement plans and the Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) 
specify such a strategy as a possible default investment option. Here we show that the appeal 
depends on the interest rate environment and the design of the glide path. In a normal interest 
rate environment, a life cycle fund results in less old-age consumption, compared to the money-
back approach. By contrast, in a low interest rate environment, life cycle funds can provide 
consumption comparable to that under the money-back guarantee scenario. For instance, a life 
cycle fund with a conservative equity exposure, such as the traditional ‘100 minus age’ rule, 
results in lower old-age consumption for both the normal and low interest rate scenarios. By 
contrast, a life cycle approach with a higher equity exposure maintained longer (e.g. reducing 
a 100% equity after age 40 by 2.5 percentage points per year) can generate higher consumption. 
In sum, our work confirms that money-back guarantees were an effective way to protect 
workers from investment losses in their IRAs during a ‘normal’ capital market environment. 
Unfortunately, when interest rates are persistently low, the money-back IRA does not protect 
the saving public; rather it can cause unintended damage eroding old-age consumption below 
what it would be otherwise. Life cycle funds with sufficient equity exposure could be seen as 
an alternative risk mitigation strategy to the money-back IRA, and we show these are preferable 
to a guaranteed IRA.  
Our findings have general relevance for policymakers, regulators, and plan sponsors in 
many nations implementing individual retirement accounts to build funded pensions, seeking 
to respond to the challenges of population aging. These include the U.S. 401(k) retirement 
accounts, the Pan European Pension Product (PEPP) recently launched by the European 
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Parliament, and defined contribution plans in Australia, Hong Kong, and Chile. Of key 
importance in such funded pension systems is the approporiate design of default investment 
options which should, on the one hand, protect savers from downside risks, while at the same 
time preserving the opportunity for savers to access the capital markets. Regulators and 
consumers will need to better understand the opportunity costs associated with money-back 
guarantees and other risk mitigation techniques such as life cycle funds.  
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Figure 1:  Gross Labor Income Profiles Estimated for German Workforce by Age and 
Decile 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows estimated annual gross labor income (in €1,000) for German employees age 25-67 estimated 
using SOEP waves 1984 to 2015 (all in €2015, excluding self-employed). For each year of age, the sample was 
split into deciles of labor income; then the natural logarithm of labor income was regressed on age, age², and year 
fixed effects to obtain fitted values of labor income for each level. Regression coefficients, decile-specific 
dispersion measures, and transition probabilities across income deciles are reported in Table C.1. 
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Figure 2:  Parameter Matching: Base Case 
 
Note: The Figure shows the value of accumulated financial assets by age in Deutsche Bundesbank’s Panel on 
Household Finances (PHF) and mean asset holdings generated from the model. Relying on a matching procedure 
related to Love (2010), the calibration with regard to the discount factor 𝛽𝛽 and the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion 𝛾𝛾 is chosen such that the sum of relative squared differences between empirical observations and model 
wealth (in real terms) is minimized for five year age groups centered around age 25 to age 60. For the matching 
procedure, we use Riester IRAs embedding an investment guarantee, a nominal risk-free interest rate of 3%, 
inflation of 1.75%, and an equity risk premium of 6% (with volatility of 21.41%). The best fit is achieved by a 
discount factor of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.93 combined with relative risk aversion of 𝛾𝛾 = 7. Financial wealth derived from PHF 
comprises all forms of fixed income, equity, pension accounts, and other investments (including real estate funds, 
managed accounts, etc.), while model wealth is the sum of direct stock and bond holdings plus IRA balances. As 
the PHF reports asset holdings other than IRAs only at the household level, individual values are derived by 
dividing household assets by two if a spouse is present and then adding individual pension accounts.  
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Figure 3:  Life Cycle Profiles With and Without IRA Guarantee: Base Case  
Panel A:  With guarantee 
 
Panel B:  Without guarantee 
 
 
 
Note: The Figure shows mean values of labor and pension income, non-housing consumption, financial asset 
holdings (bonds, stocks, and Riester account balances) and retirement plan payouts (in €2015). Panel A refers to 
the base case, where the nominal risk-free rate is 3% and inflation is 1.75%. Stock investments earn a risk premium 
of 6% and volatility of 21.41%. Preference parameters include a discount factor of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.93 and relative risk 
aversion of 𝛾𝛾 = 7. Panel B refers to the otherwise identical case without a money-back guarantee in the IRA. Mean 
values are calculated based on 100,000 simulated life cycles which rely on optimal policies that were derived for 
all possible combinations of current income, cash on hand, IRA balances, guarantee amounts, and annuity payouts. 
Prior to retirement at age 67, the IRA is fully invested in equities, from age 67 to 84 the asset allocation consists 
of 20% stocks, and 80% bonds. From age 85 onward, the plan pays out a lifetime annuity. See Section 3 for details. 
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Figure 4:  IRA Participation Rates and Plan Contributions as a Percent of Gross Labor 
Income by Age: Base Case  
Panel A:  Participation rates 
 
 
Panel B:  Contributions  
(conditional on participation) 
 
 
Note: Panel A shows the fraction of individuals making contributions to the IRA by age under the two alternative 
scenarios. For additional notes on base case parameters, see Figure 3. Panel B of the Figure illustrates the pattern 
of average contributions (including subsidies) to IRAs (conditional on participation) as a percent of gross labor 
income by age, with and without a money-back guarantee. Results are drawn from 100,000 simulated optimal life 
cycles. 
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Figure 5:  Consumption Differences and Percent Better off by Age Without versus With 
the IRA Guarantee: Base Case  
 
 
Note: The fan chart at the top of the Figure illustrates path-wise differences in non-housing consumption drawn 
from 100,000 simulated optimal life cycles for IRAs without versus with a money-back guarantee. The cyan line 
represents the mean consumption difference, while darker areas indicate a higher probability density (between the 
5 and 95% quantiles). Differences are expressed as a percent of optimal consumption with the money-back 
guarantee. The bottom panel shows the percentage of individuals with higher optimal consumption without versus 
with the money-back guarantee. For further notes on base case parameters see Figure 3. 
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Figure 6:  Heterogeneity of Impacts by Lifetime Income of Abolishing the IRA 
Guarantee: Contributions and Old-Age Consumption 
Panel A:  𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇 = 3%, 𝝅𝝅 = 1.75% 
 
Panel B:  𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇 = 0%, 𝝅𝝅 = 0% 
 
 
Note: This Figure illustrates the effects of abolishing the money-back guarantee on total contributions (including 
subsidies; in percent of average labor income), and average non-housing consumption during retirement, by 
average lifetime earnings for a normal (Panel A) and a low (Panel B) interest rate and inflation scenario. Changes 
in consumption are in percent of the guarantee case. Consumption increases (decreases) are indicated by green 
(purple) circles and color intensity is stronger for larger changes (white circles indicate tiny changes). Results are 
drawn from 100,000 simulated optimal life cycles. Further notes on parameters see Figure 3. 
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Table 1:  Costs and Benefits of IRA Money-back Guarantees for Participants and 
Providers (as a % of total contributions) 
Investment horizon (years)  42  30  20  10  
          
Panel A:  Guarantee Costs Charged to Participant      
          
if = 3%  9.7  10.7  11.2  10.9  
if = 0%  35.8  30.8  25.7  19.0  
          
Panel B:  Mean Guarantee Payouts to Participant      
          
if = 3%  3.1  4.3  5.8  7.6  
if = 0%  21.9  21.0  19.5  16.9  
          
Panel C:  Mean Profits for Provider (Put Hedge Approach)      
          
if = 3%  2.2  1.6  0.7  -0.8  
if = 0%  -7.0  -6.7  -6.3  -5.5  
          
 
Note: Table 1 reports mean costs and payouts to the IRA participant and the guarantee product provider resulting 
from using fairly-priced put options to hedge the money-back guarantee on contributions. The example assumes 
constant annual contributions, and the guarantee is provided at the end of the investment horizon (retirement). The 
product provider buys at-the-money put options maturing at retirement to hedge downside risk for each 
contribution amount. Option pricing follows Black and Scholes (1973) with an assumed equity volatility of 21.41% 
p.a. and interest rates of 3% and 0%. The simulation relies on 100,000 Monte Carlo paths using the same volatility 
and an equity risk premium of 6%. 
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Table 2:  Heterogeneity Analysis for High, Middle, and Low Income Workers: Base 
Case 
Lifetime income  Top 10%  Middle 10%  Bottom 10%  
       Guarantee With Without With Without With Without 
                                           Panel A:  Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 25-39  18.31  100%  15.33  100%  11.88  100%  
Age 40-59  22.96  101%  15.77  100%  11.26  100%  
Age 60-79  25.23  102%  14.97  101%  9.03  101%  
Age 80-100  20.89  103%  12.59  103%  6.89  102%  
              
Panel B:  Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  19.93  100%  9.44  100%  2.89  100%  
Age 40-59  77.16  99%  16.40  96%  3.53  95%  
Age 60-79  80.44  95%  22.12  88%  8.58  88%  
Age 80-100  10.63  91%  2.26  82%  0.95  81%  
              
Panel C:  IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  6.15  106%  2.61  106%  0.32  109%  
Age 40-59  70.26  108%  30.79  110%  4.34  118%  
Age 60-79  143.21  110%  68.19  113%  12.80  124%  
Age 80-84  33.15  110%  15.76  113%  2.93  124%  
              
Panel D:  IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 67: lump sum 31.64  108%  15.55  113%  4.04  126%  
Age 68-84: drawdown 11.36  110%  5.40  113%  1.00  124%  
Age 85-100: annuity 11.38  110%  5.44  113%  1.08  124%  
             
Panel E:  Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%) 
             
Age 68-84: drawdown 30.8  33.4  20.7  22.8  4.5  5.4  
Age 85-100: annuity 40.2  43.2  25.6  28.1  5.7  6.9  
             
Panel F:  IRA Shortfall Probability (%) 
             
Age 67 0.0  3.9  0.0  5.8  0.0  11.2  
              
Note: Panels A-D of Table 2 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets, 
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for the top 10%, middle 10%, and bottom 10% of lifetime income 
earners. Results for columns labeled ‘Without’ indicate the percent of the respective guarantee values. Panel E 
quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs financed by after-tax payouts from the IRA. 
Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls short of the sum of contributions 
and subsidies. IRA assets are held entirely in stocks until retirement (protected with the hedges described above), 
while after retirement only 20% is allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000 
simulation optimal life cycle paths and summing up individual lifetime labor incomes (all in real terms). For further 
notes on base case parameters see Figure 3. 
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Table 3:  Percent of Individuals by Age and Lifetime Income Decile Having Higher 
Consumption Without versus With the IRA Guarantee: Base Case 
Age  25-39  40-59  60-79  80-100  
          
Top 10%  62  71  69  77  
Middle 10%  60  61  75  87  
Bottom 10%  51  43  71  88  
          
 
Note: Table 3 reports the percent of individuals having higher non-housing consumption without the money-back 
guarantee, by age and lifetime income decile. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000 simulation paths for 
optimal life cycles, adding up individual lifetime labor incomes (in real terms). The baseline case calibration uses 
a nominal risk-free rate of 3% and inflation rate of 1.75%. 
 
 
Table 4:  Percent of Individuals by Age and Lifetime Income Decile Having Positive IRA 
Contributions, Without versus With the IRA Guarantee: Base Case  
Age  25-39  40-59  60-66  
    
Guarantee  With Without With Without With Without 
                                           
Top 10% 66  64  82  90  71  74  
Middle 10% 40  40  68  68  63  65  
Bottom 10% 11  12  35  36  63  69  
              
Note: Table 4 reports the percent of individuals with positive contribution rates with and without the money-back 
guarantee, by age and lifetime income decile. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000 simulation paths, adding 
up individual lifetime labor incomes (in real terms). For further notes on base case parameters see Figure 3.  
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Table 5:  Impacts of Different Guarantees: Base Case 
Guarantee    With (nominal) Without 
With 
(real)  
With 
(nominal) Without 
With  
(real)   
 
    
       if  3%  0% 
         π  1.75%  0% 
                                
           
Panel A:  Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 25-39  15.21  100%  100%  15.15  100%  
Same as 
for With 
(nominal) 
 
Age 40-59  16.22  100%  100%  15.86  101%   
Age 60-79  15.69  101%  98%  14.28  103%   
Age 80-100  12.98  103%  96%  11.17  111%   
              
Panel B:  Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  9.96  100%  102%  10.77  95%    
Age 40-59  24.42  98%  105%  31.49  89%    
Age 60-79  29.42  91%  109%  41.45  82%    
Age 80-84  3.25  85%  111%  3.74  67%    
              
Panel C:  IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
 
Age 25-39  2.76  106%  78%  0.77  287%    
Age 40-59  32.70  109%  82%  11.56  204%    
Age 60-79  71.17  112%  84%  25.44  178%    
Age 80-84  16.44  112%  84%  5.12  175%                  
Panel D:  IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 67: lump sum 16.32  112%  84%  7.92  150%    
Age 68-84: drawdown 5.64  112%  84%  1.91  175%    
Age 85-100: annuity 5.68  112%  85%  3.17  170%    
             
Panel E:  Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%) 
             
Age 68-84: drawdown 21.0  23.1  18.2  8.3  13.8    
Age 85-100: annuity 26.4  28.9  23.1  14.9  23.2    
             
Panel F:  IRA Shortfall Probability (%) 
             
Age 67 0.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  18.1    
              
Note: Panels A-D of Table 5 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets, 
IRA balances, and payouts for a real rather than a nominal money-back guarantee (the latter as percent of the 
guarantee case). Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs which is financed by 
after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls 
short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. For the first three specifications the nominal risk-free rate and 
inflation rate are assumed as constant at rates of 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 3% and 𝜋𝜋 = 1.75%, and the equity risk premium is 6% (with 
volatility of 21.41%). The latter three specifications refer to a low interest rate and inflation scenario with rates of 
𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 0% and 𝜋𝜋 = 0%. Naturally, for zero inflation the results for the real guarantee match those of the nominal 
guarantee. 
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Table 6:  Outcomes of Alternative Life Cycle Risk Mitigation Techniques versus IRA 
Money-Back Guarantee 
 Plan design    With guarantee 
LC fund 
‘100–age’ 
LC fund 
‘100-until-
40, -2.5’ 
 With guarantee 
LC fund 
‘100–age’ 
LC fund 
‘100-until-
40, -2.5’    
 
    
       if  3%  0% 
         π  1.75%  0% 
                                
           
Panel A:  Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 25-39  15.21  100%  100%  15.15  100%  100%  
Age 40-59  16.22  100%  100%  15.86  100%  101%  
Age 60-79  15.69  94%  96%  14.28  99%  100%  
Age 80-100  12.98  89%  94%  11.17  98%  101%  
              
Panel B:  Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  9.96  104%  99%  10.77  100%  97%  
Age 40-59  24.42  98%  91%  31.49  99%  94%  
Age 60-79  29.42  102%  90%  41.45  95%  90%  
Age 80-84  3.25  94%  78%  3.74  87%  81%  
              
Panel C:  IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
 
Age 25-39  2.76  89%  116%  0.77  199%  279%  
Age 40-59  32.70  86%  112%  11.56  126%  169%  
Age 60-79  71.17  67%  86%  25.44  98%  122%  
Age 80-84  16.44  64%  83%  5.12  93%  114%                
Panel D:  IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 67: lump sum 16.32  60%  79%  7.92  92%  107%  
Age 68-84: drawdown 5.64  64%  82%  1.91  93%  115%  
Age 85-100: annuity 5.68  63%  82%  3.17  93%  113%  
             
Panel E:  Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%) 
             
Age 68-84: drawdown 21.0  14.7  18.3  8.3  7.8  9.5  
Age 85-100: annuity 26.4  18.5  22.9  14.9  14.1  16.7  
             
Panel F:  IRA Shortfall Probability (%) 
             
Age 67 0.0  0.8  1.3  0.0  18.7  17.6  
              
Note: Panels A-D of Table 6 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets, 
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for three plan designs and two capital market environments, with the 
money-back guarantee. Results for columns labeled LC fund ‘100-age’ and LC fund ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ indicate 
the percent of the respective guarantee values. Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing 
costs financed by after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at 
retirement falls short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. The first three (second three) columns use a 
nominal risk-free rate of 3% (0%) and inflation rate of 1.75% (0%), respectively. For the plan design with the 
guarantee, IRA contributions (minus put premiums) are invested entirely in stocks until retirement. For the life 
cycle funds, the fraction of assets invested in risky stocks versus bonds is specified according to a ‘100-age’ rule 
(or ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule, respectively) with no money-back guarantee. To maintain consistency, in all plan 
designs, after retirement only 20% is allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds.  
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Table 7:  Percent of Individuals with Higher Consumption with a Life Cycle Fund 
versus a Money-Back Guarantee  
Age  25-39  40-59  60-79  80-100  
          
Panel A:  ‘Normal’ Capital Markets (𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇 = 3%, 𝝅𝝅 = 1.75%)   
          
‘100-age’ rule  44  41  33  33  
‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule  39  47  44  47  
          
Panel B:  ‘Low Return’ Capital Markets (𝒊𝒊𝒇𝒇 = 0%, 𝝅𝝅 = 0%)  
          
‘100-age’ rule  35  61  43  44  
‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule  34  64  54  55  
          
 
Note: Table 7 shows the fraction (in %) of individuals having higher non-housing consumption under two life 
cycle risk mitigation strategies, relative to a money-back guarantee and 100% equity allocation throughout the 
accumulation phase. To determine the percentage equity allocation, the first life cycle fund applies a relatively 
conservative ‘100-age’ rule, and the second one is fully invested in equities until age 40 and then reduces its equity 
allocation by 2.5 percentage points per year (termed ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule). To maintain consistency, in all plan 
designs, after retirement only 20% are allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds. Panel A considers the ‘normal’ capital 
market scenario (nominal risk-free rate of 3% and inflation rate of 1.75%) and Panel B addresses the low return 
environment (nominal risk-free rate and inflation rate of 0%). 
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Table 8:  Sensitivity Analysis for Different Preferences and Fees: Base Case 
Specification  EZW: lower EIS  EZW: higher EIS  Front-end load: 5%  
       Guarantee With Without With Without With Without 
                                           Panel A:  Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 25-39  15.34  100%  15.00  100%  15.20  100%  
Age 40-59  16.21  100%  16.22  100%  16.20  100%  
Age 60-79  15.17  101%  16.54  102%  15.55  102%  
Age 80-100  12.13  102%  14.52  104%  12.72  103%  
              
Panel B:  Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  9.18  100%  11.07  99%  10.06  99%  
Age 40-59  22.97  100%  25.95  98%  25.02  97%  
Age 60-79  29.95  92%  29.09  91%  31.55  91%  
Age 80-100  3.11  79%  4.32  92%  3.64  85%  
              
Panel C:  IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case) 
              
Age 25-39  1.68  100%  4.70  113%  2.66  102%  
Age 40-59  25.32  103%  46.88  111%  30.69  110%  
Age 60-79  56.49  109%  97.35  112%  65.32  114%  
Age 80-84  12.97  109%  22.79  112%  15.06  114%  
              
Panel D:  IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)               
Age 67: lump sum 14.26  106%  19.89  112%  15.20  113%  
Age 68-84: drawdown 4.45  109%  7.77  112%  5.16  114%  
Age 85-100: annuity 4.57  109%  7.69  112%  5.22  114%  
             
Panel E:  Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%) 
             
Age 68-84: drawdown 17.3  18.7  26.9  29.4  19.4  21.7  
Age 85-100: annuity 22.3  24.0  32.7  35.5  24.7  27.4  
             
Panel F:  IRA Shortfall Probability (%) 
             
Age 67 0.0  7.8  0.0  4.9  0.0  7.5  
              
Note: Panels A-D of Table 8 report mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets, 
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for three different cases with and without guarantee (the latter as percent 
of the guarantee case). Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs which is financed 
by after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls 
short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. In the first and second case, we allow for Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW) 
preferences in order to disentangle risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Starting from 
the CRRA-implied EIS of 𝜓𝜓 = 1/7 = 0.1429 in the first (second) specification, EIS is decreased (increased) to 
0.1 (0.2) while holding relative risk aversion constant at 𝛾𝛾 = 7. In the third specification a front-end load of 5% 
for each contribution (including subsidies) is charged. In all specifications, the nominal risk-free rate and inflation 
rate are assumed constant at 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 3% and 𝜋𝜋 = 1.75%, and the equity risk premium is 6% (with volatility of 21.41%). 
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Appendix A: Income Taxation and Social Security Contributions 
Our model reflects the complexity of German social security and tax regulations as 
realistically as possible. The state-organized social insurance system includes contributions to 
pension, unemployment, health, and nursing care insurance. During the work life, employees 
and employers each contribute 9.35% of gross labor income to the statutory pension system and 
1.5% to unemployment insurance (to an assessment ceiling of €71,400 p.a.). Health insurance 
costs 7.3% of labor income and nursing care insurance amounts to 1.175% for employees (to 
an assessment ceiling of €48,600 p.a.). Retirees do not pay pension and unemployment 
insurance contributions, but they pay 7.3% from pension income for health and 2.35% for 
nursing care insurance.  
Federal income taxes are charged based on taxable income, which is gross income less 
(in part) contributions to the state-organized social insurance system, contributions and 
subsidies paid into tax-qualified IRAs, and several tax-exempt amounts. In 2015, 80% of both 
the employee’s and employer’s contribution to the statutory pension system could be deducted. 
This tax deductible contribution increases in 2% increments, such that in 2025, the full amount 
can be deducted. In addition, an individual’s payments to nursing care insurance and 96% of 
the contribution to health insurance are tax deductible. The latter two may be increased by 
unemployment insurance contributions as long as the sum of the three is below €1,900. 
Additionally €36 is always added to so-called provident expenses. Furthermore, taxable income 
is reduced by income-related standard deductions of €1,000 for employees and €102 for 
retirees. In the context of our model, contributions and subsidies paid to Riester IRAs are tax 
deductible up to an annual limit of €2,100.  
The progressive German income tax system grants tax-exemption on the first €8,354 of 
taxable income. Between €8,254 and €52,881, marginal tax rates increase from 14% up to 42% 
of taxable income. For income above €250,730 the marginal tax rate is 45%. Taxes determined 
by these regulations are additionally increased by a solidarity supplement tax of 5.5%. The 
following figure illustrates the share of total deductions as percentage of gross income (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇), 
i.e. social security and tax payments, for both employees and retirees. 
 
Note: This Figure represents the share of deductions (in %) from gross labor income resulting from income taxes 
and contributions to the German social insurance system. The Figure assumes a worker (retiree) with no children 
and no contributions to (income from) tax-qualified IRAs.  
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Appendix B: Rental Costs and Number of Children 
Panel A:  Rental Costs as Share  
of Net Income 
 
Panel B:  Number of Children Living  
with the Parents 
 
 
Note: Panel A of this Figure illustrates tenants’ rental costs as a fraction of net income (𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻). Raw data are from 
all waves of SOEP from 1990 to 2015. The definition of housing costs for tenants is broad; besides rental payments 
we include costs for hot and cold water, heating, garbage disposal and cleaning services. Housing costs in SOEP 
are provided solely at the household level, so costs are divided by the aggregate of head’s and – if present – 
spouse’s net income. The population refers to all households in the panel, irrespective of the potential presence of 
spouses. The subsamples of females and males do indicate singles’ housing costs, but in the model we use 
population values to avoid the need to make assumptions about relationship status. Panel B illustrates the average 
number of children living in a household with parents over the life cycle. Raw data were taken from all waves of 
the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1984-2015.  
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Appendix C: The Labor Income Process 
Estimation of the discretized Markovian income process relies on non-zero labor income 
observations of employed persons aged 25-67 from all waves of SOEP until year 2015. All 
income figures are converted to year 2015 prices (measured in €1,000) and in all specifications 
and for every age we drop the top and bottom 1% of observations to diminish effects of outliers. 
Next, each remaining observation is assigned to one of 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 equally-sized income levels. The 
lowest (highest) 1/𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠  of observations are assigned to income level 1 (level 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠), etc.35 To 
estimate deterministic annual income, we conduct pooled OLS regressions for each income 
level 𝑠𝑠, where the natural logarithm of labor income, ln𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠, is regressed on first and second 
order polynomials in age and year fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are then used to 
determine predicted age-dependent log income figures, converted to level values and 
interpreted to (roughly) indicate the level’s middle income. 
The second component of the labor income process is the variation of observed log 
income, ln𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠, around the regression-based predicted values, ln𝑌𝑌�𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠. Using the standard 
deviation of the difference, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑠𝑠, as measure of dispersion, a purely transitory shock is added to 
the level’s deterministic trend. The natural logarithm of the shock is assumed to be normally 
distributed with ln𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 ~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑠𝑠2 ,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑠𝑠2 ) and is intended to reflect additional variation in 
income beyond transitions between income states.  
Finally we estimate a Markov transition matrix, which quantifies the probabilities of 
migrating from current income state 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 to all other income states in the next period. To derive 
migration probabilities, we only consider cases where consecutive observations from one age 
to the next are available and no change in the highest level of education has occurred. Both the 
transitory shock component within a level and transition probabilities are assumed to be age-
invariant.  
Panel A of Table C.1 shows state-dependent coefficients of the labor earnings regression 
(all being significant at the 1% confidence level). Panel B reports the standard deviations 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢,𝑠𝑠 
between observed (log) income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 from predicted (log) income 𝑌𝑌�𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠 for all levels. The variation 
is U-shaped in income level, meaning that heterogeneity in labor earnings is higher at more 
extreme income levels. In addition, the top and bottom level variation is more than twice as 
high as of the adjacent levels. Panel C quantifies the transition probabilities 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 from current 
income level 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 to level 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1 in the next period. Shading in the Table is darker the higher the 
probability. The likelihood of remaining in the same income level is especially high for top and 
bottom income deciles, but also for middle income receivers remaining in the same level is the 
most likely event.  
Table C.2 compares the empirical moments of the SOEP data, and of simulated labor 
income from applying the Markovian and Carroll and Samwick (1997) methods. Despite 
simplifications with respect to age-independence of transitory shock components and migration 
probabilities the empirical moments over age ranges of 10 years are sufficiently close to infer 
that the Markovian method adequately simulates labor income.   
                                                 
35 Increasing the number of income levels 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠, is expected to improve the fit between raw data and simulated income 
data, but also increases model runtime. Overall, we find that for the total population and subsamples of females 
and males 𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 10 achieves a satisfactory fit of the distribution parameters of the SOEP data (see Table C.2).  
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Table C.1: Gross Labor Income Parameters Estimated by Deciles using SOEP 
 Panel A:  Regression Coefficients from Estimated Models of Log Labor Income by Income Decile 
           
Income decile st 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Constant 2.479 2.739 2.811 2.825 2.861 2.851 2.884 2.860 2.786 2.500 
 (63.25) (134.75) (123.44) (220.05) (277.13) (267.68) (247.69) (205.92) (148.21) (72.24) 
Age / 100 1.093 1.356 1.916 2.454 2.737 3.233 3.493 4.090 5.121 7.782 
 (5.57) (13.12) (15.72) (37.62) (53.19) (61.58) (60.53) (61.29) (54.70) (45.78) 
Age² / (100)² -1.439 -1.613 -2.150 -2.655 -2.878 -3.372 -3.522 -4.051 -5.050 -7.794 
 (-6.08) (-12.68) (-14.13) (-33.08) (-45.93) (-53.02) (-50.36) (-50.16) (-44.06) (-37.90) 
           
Number of obs. 17,502 17,463 17,459 17,391 17,382 17,449 17,449 17,399 17,515 17,407 
F 4.01 8.72 43.89 168.32 308.38 395.63 475.42 502.74 537.94 262.73 
Prob > F 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.046 0.151 0.374 0.543 0.620 0.659 0.669 0.661 0.452 
           
 Panel B:  Standard Deviation: Difference of Actual from Predicted Log Labor Income 
           
Income decile st 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
σu,s 0.166 0.073 0.055 0.043 0.037 0.038 0.043 0.053 0.069 0.158 
           
 Panel C:  Transition Probabilities between Labor Income Deciles 𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕, 𝒔𝒔𝒕𝒕+𝟏𝟏 (%) 
           
 st+1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  s t 
1 61.9 18.1 7.6 4.2 2.8 1.7 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.5 
2 25.1 45.7 15.3 6.0 2.9 2.0 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 
3 5.9 22.5 41.1 15.9 6.5 3.7 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.4 
4 2.7 6.2 21.3 38.5 17.9 7.1 3.5 1.6 0.8 0.4 
5 1.7 2.9 7.0 21.4 36.6 18.2 7.1 3.0 1.5 0.6 
6 1.0 1.8 3.5 7.4 21.0 37.4 18.3 6.4 2.4 0.9 
7 0.6 1.2 1.9 3.6 7.5 20.2 40.0 18.4 5.0 1.5 
8 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.8 2.9 6.6 20.1 45.2 17.8 3.2 
9 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.3 2.3 5.3 19.1 55.4 14.5 
10 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.5 3.2 14.9 77.6 
            
 
Note: Panel A of Table C.1 reports regression coefficients and t-statistics for gross labor income deciles estimated 
using the SOEP (see text); all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Panel B shows the standard deviation of 
differences between annual logs of labor income and the regression’s fitted values within each income level. Panel 
C depicts the conditional transition probabilities 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1  from the individual’s current income level 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 to all possible 
future income levels 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+1. The darkness of the shading is proportional to the transition probability. Standard 
deviations and transition probabilities are assumed to be age-invariant. Observations with implied hourly wages 
below 80% of year 2015’s minimum wage and employees working below 20 hours per week are excluded from 
the estimation. A minimum wage of €8.50 was introduced in 2015 (i.e. all SOEP observations are from the pre-
minimum wage period) and omitting this data filter would result in inclusion of observations illegal under current 
law. 
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Table C.2: Moments of Labor Income (Entire Workforce) 
Age  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  
          
Panel A:  Mean  
          
SOEP  29.54  35.12  36.07  31.12  
Markov chain  33.76  38.07  39.62  37.90  
Carroll and Samwick (1997)  31.51  34.77  35.35  33.18  
          
Panel B:  Standard deviation  
          SOEP  13.80  17.42  17.78  19.60  
Markov chain  13.64  18.34  20.35  19.06  
Carroll and Samwick (1997)  8.40  13.93  17.85  19.82  
          
Panel C:  Skewness  
          
SOEP  0.15  0.73  0.79  0.76  
Markov chain  0.91  1.17  1.24  1.13  
Carroll and Samwick (1997)  0.81  1.25  1.64  2.06  
          
Panel D:  Kurtosis  
          SOEP  2.73  3.43  3.50  3.22  
Markov chain  4.12  4.51  4.58  4.29  
Carroll and Samwick (1997)  4.27  5.89  8.08  12.41  
          
 
Note: Table C.2 reports the empirical moments of labor income for observed SOEP data as well as for two data-
generating processes. Annual labor income measured in €1,000 refers to the total workforce. The method denoted 
‘Markov chain’ is employed in the model (discussed in Section 3.3). The benchmark method is from Carroll and 
Samwick (1997) using the regression model ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡100 + 𝛾𝛾2 ∙ 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2(100)2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and resulting coefficients 
𝛾𝛾0 = 2.6926, 𝛾𝛾1 = 3.7645, 𝛾𝛾2 = −4.0241 (all significant at the 1% level); the variance of the permanent income 
shock 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 = 1.69% and variance of the transitory income shock 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 = 5.84%. Using Carroll and Samwick’s 
method, Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) and Krebs and Yao (2016) find similar permanent, but higher transitory 
shock components for Germany. The lower transitory shock in our estimation is attributed to the additional data 
filters applied (outlined in Table C.1). Reported numbers are mean values over age ranges of 10 years from 100,000 
simulation paths. 
 
 
